In most developing countries, like Ghana, the abuse of human rights and discretionary power by both politicians and administrators is not only rampant and legion but also on the rise. This abuse is mostly the result of the complexity and diversity of the state in developing countries, which have increased the power available to governments to pursue socio-economic development programmes. The state in most developing countries is expected not only to perform the traditional functions of government, such as maintaining law and order, but also to provide education and social welfare, manage health programmes, operate transportation and communication facilities and organise various cultural and recreational events. Through the performance of these several and multifarious roles, politicians and public servants have acquired enormous power. In other words, "the more society is administered, the more power is concentrated in the hands of politicians and public servants."1 This exercise of power and authority by politicians and public servants has led to the growth of unethical activities in the public sector in many developing countries. Politicians become corrupt. citizens are incarcerated in the name of the supreme interest of national sccurity without the due process of law, while employees are dismissed without resort to laid down procedure of labour laws. The more the cases relating to the misuse of power and authority are brought to public attcntion, the more worried the public becomes. Thc public in most developing countries views the st ate as too big and too powerful, with tendcncics of the legendary lcviathan. Consequently, there is a demand for a clean administration and Dwivedi, O.P., Ethics and values of public responsibility and accountability, International Review of
improved moral fibre in public officials and politicians, the responsible use of power and authority, and administrative accountability.2 The major concem in most developing countries is how to ensure that those who have power exercise it responsibly so that they can be held accountable for their actions. One of the formal quasi-judicial institutions created under the 1992 Ghanaian Fourth Republican Constitution, the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), or what is commonly known in the Scandinavian countries as the ombudsman3, is solely charged with performing such a role. This paper examines the powers and jurisdiction, prodecures in respect of investigations, and the financial position of the CHRAJ in the promotion of human rights and public accountability in Ghana. The paper begins with a historical review of the operations of the ombudsman institution in Ghana. lt then discusses the CHRAJ in the light of its jurisdic tion, procedures for investigation and financial position. Finally, the paper suggests recommendations ai med at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the CHRAJ. coming into force of the Constitution, without nobody being appointed to the office. When the Busia regime was overthrown on 13 January 1972 in a coup d 'etat led by the then Colonel I.K. Acheampong, the National Redemption Council (NRC) which assumed the reins of government, established the lnvestigations Division of the S pec ial Action Unit 1mder NRC Decree 235 of 1973 to deal with abuse of power by public officials. The Investigations Division, however, tumed out to be a debt-collecting one for the government and individuals rather than a grievance redressing one. lt was under the 1979 Constitution and the Third Republic that Ghana actually had an ombudsman. Unlike the 1969 Constitution, the 1979 Constitution not only stipulated that an ombudsman office should be established but went on to mandatorily enjoin the government of the Third Republic to appoint somebody to the office one year after the coming into force of the Constitution. The Ombudsman's Act (Act 400) of 1980, which was passed by Parliament, empowered the ombudsman to investigate all acts of commission and omission by the public service, the arrned forces, the police service and the prison service. In other words, the ombudsman was to receive complaints about in justice and maladministration against government agencies and officials from aggrieved persons. He had the power to investigate, criticise and recommend corrective actions. He was to submit annual reports on the operations of his office to Parliament.
I. The History of the Ombudsmans Institution In Ghana
The jurisdiction of the ombudsman was, however, severely limited by the 1979 Constitu tion and Act 400. He was barred from investigating into (a) cases which were sub judice; (b) matters relating to the prerogative of mercy; (c) matters involving the relations or dealings between the government of Ghana and other countries or international organisa tions. Another limitation on the powers of the ombudsn,:ian was that he cannot initiale legal proceedings in any court to enforce his recommendations. This made the ombudsman's recommendations non-biting and non-binding on erring govemment institutions and organisations.
The annual ombudsman reports from 1979 to 1986 -a period of seven years -rcvcal that the ombudsman's office received 8,521 complaints from the public and only 6,345 of them were investigated, while 176 were considered as outside the jurisdiction of the ombudsman. Out of the 6,345 cases investigated and reported on by the ombudsman only a paltry 2,140 were enforced.5 The non-enforcement of his recommendations made the Ombudsman, Mr. Justice G.K. Andoh, not only a "toothless bulldog" or a "watchdog in chains" but also prompted him to make a special direct appeal in his 1986 annual report to the governmcnt of the erstwhile Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), the regime that overthrew the democratically elected civilian govemment of Hilla Limann 's People's National Party govemment on 31 December 1981, to help and cooperate with his office to enforce his recommendations. Apparently, the ombudsman feit slighted by the inability of the PNDC govemment to enforce his directives on the reinstatement of some employees of the State Fishing Corporation who were unjustifiably retrenched in 1984 without following laid down labour laws. R epe ated appeals by the ombudsman to the PNDC for three years to have them reinstated fell on deaf ears.6
The ombudsman institution was also hampered by Jack of office accommodation. The national office of the ombudsman had no permanent accomodation. Within a period of eight years, his office had been relocated four times. This made it difficult for aggrieved persons to physically locate the national headquarters. Even though the 1979 Constitution and the Ombudsman Act (Act 400) of 1980 stipulated that the office of the ombudsman should be decentralised to the then nine regions and existing 65 districts, only three regional capitals, namely Sekondi-Takoradi, Cape Coast and Kumasi, actually had offices. In other words, the concentration of the offices of the ombudsman in Accra, the national capital, and the other three cities undermined the accessibility and publicity that often characterise the work of ombudsmen systems elsewhere. Poor staffing situation also contributed to the rather negative performance of the ombudsman in Ghana during the period under review. The institution was not only short of qualified and compctent personnel to effectively actualise its operations but also its staff strength generally fell below optimum level. Available st atistics of staffing up to 1988 revealed that the personnel strength of the ombudsman was 107 in the four offices. Of this total, an average of about 45 % falls into the senior grade, while the rest are junior officers. And because the ombudsman's office operated conditions of service similar to those pertaining in the civil service, it was unable to attract the requisite personnel which were better paid in the public service. For instance, an investigator, a qualified lawyer, who worked with the office of thc ombudsman, eamcd 45,000 cedis in 1988, whereas if he were employed in the public service, like a parastatal, would have taken almost double the salary. The result of thc disparity in salaries and other conditions of service is that the institution of the ombudsman was unable to retain experienced investigators (lawyers). lt therefore had to rcly on lawyers on national service, who after completing their service of one year, left to seek greener pastures clsewhere. 
IV. Handling and Dlsposal of Complalnts and Investlgatlons
One of the hallmarks of the ombudsman system in the Scandinavian countries is its ability to handle and dispose of complaints and investigations in a largely informal, inexpensive and expeditious manner. This feature seems to have been incorporated in the modus operandi of the CHRAJ. Like the 1979 Constitution ombudsman, a complaint to the CHRAJ could be made either in writing or orally to either its national office or its representatives in the regional or district branches. A written complaint is to be signed by the complainant or his agent while an oral one is reduced into writing by the person to whom the complaint is made, who appends his signature and thumbprint of the complaint. The oral complaint will benefit about 80 % of Ghana's population which is largely illiterate. Complaints to the CHRAJ could be made by any individual or a body of persons, whether corporate or unincorporated. The public may, however, be excluded from investi gations conducted by the CHRAJ.
Where the CHRAJ decides to conduct investigation into a complaint, it shall give the authority or person to whom the allegations were made against the opportunity to comrnent 11 Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. 12 Republic of Ghana, Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992, Article 146. on them and submit them to the CHRAJ within such time as specified by it. This gives discretionary power to the CHRAJ to determine which time a reply could be sought from an offending person or institution to whom allegations were made against. As an evidence at investigations, the CHRAJ is obliged to require any person who, in its opinion, is able to give any information relating to a matter being investigated by it to (a) fmnish the informa tion to the CHRAJ; (b) produce any document, paper or thing that in the CHRAJ's opinion relates to the matter being investigated and which may be in the possession or control of that person.
The CHRAJ is however seriously limited in obtaining information in two ways. First, production of official documents before the CHRAJ is subject to Article 135 of the 1992 Constitution which states that:
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an official document shall not be produced in court because its production or the disclosure of its contents will be prejudicial to the security of the State or will be injurious to the public interst.
Second, although the CHRAJ can summon before it and examine on oath or affirmation -a person required to give information or produce anything, document or paper, a complainant or any other person who the CHRAJ considers will be able to give information -, it cannot compel a person to give evidence or produce papers or documents if that person is bound by law to maintain secrecy in relation to, or not to disclose, any matter, if compliance with that requirement would be in breach of the obligation of secrecy or non-disclosure.
These are serious limitations on the powers of the CHRAJ to obtain information because what is termed "confidential" or "official" document or maintaining "secrecy or non disclosure" are very subjective criteria which could provide a mask behind which govem ment institutions, officials and agencies and the govemment itself can hide to abuse human rights and discretionary powers. The production or non-production of official documents and obligation of "secrecy and non-disclosure" are very contentious issues in the legal history of Ghana and their resolution is left at the discretion of the courts.
If, after investigations have been completed by the CHRAJ, the !alter is of the view that the decision, recommendation, act or ommission that was the subject matter of investigation (a) amounts to a breach of any of the fundamental rights and freedoms provided in the Constitution; or (b) appears to have been contrary to law; or (c) was unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, discriminatory or was in accordance with a rule of law or a provision of any Act or a practice that is unreasonable, unjust, oppressive, or discriminatory; or (d) was based wholly or partly on a mistake of law or fact; or (e) was based on irrelevant grounds or made for an improper purpose; or (f) was made in the exercise of a discretionary power and reasons should have been given for the decision, the CHRAJ is required to report its decision and the reasons for it to the appropriate person, Minister, department or authority concerned. A copy of the report and recommendations are also sent to the complainant, unlike previously, where it was only sent to the offending person or authority. This is to inform the complainant that action has been taken on his complaints. And unlike previously, where reports and recommendations of the ombudsman gathered dust on the shelves of offending persons and institutions, under the CHRAJ if within three months after the report is made no action is taken which seems appropriate to the CHRAJ to be adequate and appropriate, the Commissioner is obliged, after considering the comments (if any) made by or on behalf of the department, authority or person against whom the complaint was made, to bring an action before any court and seek such remedy as may be appropriate for the enforcement of the recommendations of the CHRAJ.
Although the CHRAJ can initiale investigations into complaints, it has also been empowered, unlike the 1979 Constitution ombudsman, to refuse to investigate any matter or complaints on the following grounds: (i) that under the law or existing administrative practice there is adequate remedy for the complaint, whether or not the complainant has availed himself of it; (ii) that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, any further investigation is unnecessary; (iii) if the complaint relates to a decision, recommendation, act or omission of which the complainant has had knowledge for more than twelve months before the complaint is received by the CHRAJ; (iv) the subject matter of the complaint is trivial; (v) the complaint is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith; (vi) the complainant does not have suffucient personal interest in the matter of the complaint.13
However, if within six months after the CHRAJ's refusal or ceasing to investigate any complaint, fresh evidence in favour of the complainant becomes available, the CHRAJ, at the request of the complainant, is mandated to reopen the case. The CHRAJ is also mandatorily required that where it decides not to investigate or to cease to investigate a complaint, it shall within 30 days of the decision inform the complainant of its decision and reasons for so doing. This stipulation was not in the 1980 Ombud�man Act. The result wa� that a lot of complainants did not know why their complaints were rejected while those of others were accepted and investigated.
13 Republic of Ghana, The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act (Act 456),
1993, Articles 5-6.
Like all ombudsmen system every where, the CHRAJ is required to submit a re po rt annually to Parliament, which shall include a summary of the matters investigated, and the action taken on them by the CHRAJ during the preceding year. Although Parliament may debate the report and pass a resolution on it, none of its resolutions can alter a decision made by a court or a matter instituted before the court by the CHRAJ. This is to guarantee the freedom and independence of the CHRAJ as weil as promote the concept of separation of po wers.
V. Finance
The 
Ministry of Finance and Economic
Planning has not only the monopoly to authorise the voting and release of funds but also approval of recruitment of staff in most public service organisations. With this trend the Commissioner and his two deputies seem to have no alternative than to compromise their ind epe ndence by begging for funds from the executive to enable them meet the logistics of the task they have been given. One caveat out of this seemingly financial strangulation of the CHRAJ is to amend the Act to include that a fixed percentage of funds be released to the CHRAJ on quarterly basis to cover its operational costs. In this way, the CHRAJ will not only have a more definite statutory source of funding, rather than d epe nd on the whims and caprices of the executive, but also promote and enhance its independence.
Concluslon
In theory, Ghana's Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) has been endowed with sufficient powers and jurisdiction necessary for it to promote human rights and check abuse of power and administrative malfeasance. In practice, however, the CHRAJ fails to get the financial autonomy and backing that will enable it perf orm its task effectively and efficiently. The success of the infant institution d epe nds on the commitment and the enthusiasm of National Democratic Congress party govemment of Flight Lieutenant J.J. Rawlings, which won both the presidential and parliamentary elections of November and December 1992 respectively. Otherwise, like its predecessor, the ombuds man, the CHRAJ may turn out to be another "toothless tiger" or a "swordless crusader". The procedure or mode of investigation should be well-delineated so that the CHRAJ does not only become an additional court in itself but also dogmatic, bureaucratic and lethargic.
Certainly, the CHRAJ has got more enlarged jurisdiction than any other ombudsman system practised in Ghana. However, one's fear is that, like most ombudsmen system, the CHRAJ may be greatly under-used.15 This is mainly because its existence and functions are not sufficiently well known to the majority ofGhanaians. A vigorous public awareness drive of the institution is therefore crucial and appropriate. 
